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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(i) of the Utah
Code Annotated.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Whether the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to

Set Aside Stipulation for Dismissal, when Plaintiff had identified no legal basis for doing so.
(Standard of appellate review: Correction of error.)
B.

Whether the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Motion to

Set Aside Stipulation for Dismissal, when a trier of fact could have reasonably found from the
evidence presented that the parties had reached a binding agreement to dismiss the matter with
prejudice. (Standard of appellate review: abuse of discretion. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc,
v. Melvin, 2000 App 100,ffif8 and 9.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The pleadings which plaintiff submitted to the trial court are void of any reference to any
constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or regulation, or reference to any legal basis
whatsoever. Now on appeal, for the first time, Plaintiff references and analyzes Rule 60(b)(1), (3)
and (6), although Rule 60(b)(6)1, and general contract principles.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The parties negotiated a settlement involving the Tamarack matter, and this present matter

^ t h o u g h Rule 60(b)(6) is cited by Plaintiff it is never addressed.
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referred to as the Summerhays matter. As a part of the parties' settlement, they dismissed the
present cause of action with prejudice. A dispute has arisen regarding whether the trust deed
given by Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc. to Plaintiff Whitewater Whirlpool Baths & Systems, Inc.
was required to be a first position trust deed. Both parties have presented evidence in their favor.
Whitewater argues that the May 11, 1999 letter from RanCo's counsel states that the
Summerhays trust deed would be a first position trust deed. Whitewater further argues that the
July 26, 1999 letter makes no express mention of an alteration of the position of the Summerhays
trust deed. RanCo argues that his counsel was not involved in the initial negotiations, that the
May 11, 1999 reference to a first position trust deed on the Summerhays matter was inadvertent
and contrary to the parties' agreement. RanCo argues, that Whitewater agents were aware that
the property was already encumbered with a first and second position trust deed, and that they
had all discussed and agreed upon a third position trust deed. Finally, RanCo also argues that
Whitewater rejected the offer in the May 11, 1999 letter and that the subsequent July 26, 1999
letter more adequately reflects the parties' agreement, which was in fact performed. It is
reasonable and proper that the Trial Court accepted RanCo's position and refused to set aside the
stipulated Dismissal with Prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about December 31, 1998 Plaintiff filed a Mechanic's Lien against the

residential property of Defendant Barbara R. Summerhays. R 3 (Plaintiffs Complaint, 1f 15).
2.

On or About March 31, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant

Barbara R. Summerhays, the property owner, and Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc., the contractor.
R 1-5 (Plaintiffs Complaint).
Bnef of Appellee
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3.

Defendant, by and through its president, Richard A. Nelson, and Plaintiff, by and

through Bryce Whitney and Ann Tucker, Plaintiffs manager and collection officer, respectively,
conducted settlement negotiations and initially established the terms for settlement of this case
(hereafter "Summerhays matter") and for the settlement of additional claims unrelated to this case
and unrelated to the property which is th subject of this dispute (hereafter "Tamarack matter").
The parties agreed to dismiss Plaintiffs Summerhays Complaint with prejudice in exchange for
Plaintiff receiving from Defendant RanCo, Inc., certain trust deeds and trust deed notes in
connection with the Tamarack matter and certain trust deeds and trust deed notes in connection
with the Summerhays matter. R 29-30 and 32 (Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson ^ 2-6 and 8). See
also Brief of Appellant, p. 2, ^| c.
4.

The parties' settlement, which involved both the Tamarack matter and the

Summerhays matter, was intended to be a global and complete resolution, the whole being
contingent upon each and every part of the agreement. R 31 (Affidavit/Richard A. Nelson,fflj1011). Plaintiff does not contest that the resolution of the matter was in connection with a global
settlement, wherein all terms were dependent on the others. See Record generally.
5.

The trust deed in connection with the Tamarack matter was to be first position

trust deeds. R 30-31 (Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson,ffi[4, 5 and 8). The trust deed in connection
with the present Summerhays matter was not required to be first position trust deeds. Id. But See
Brief of Appellant, pp. 5 and 6.
6.

In the course of settlement, Defendant RanCo had shown Plaintiffs agents and/or

representatives his master escrow file, which indicated, in connection with the property relating to
the present matter, unlike the property in the other claims, the presence of a first and second
Brief of Appellee
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position trust deeds, leaving the potential, at best, for a third position trust Deed. R 30 and 32
(Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson, ^} 5 and 16). Plaintiff has not heretofore denied this fact. See
Record generally. This fact is not disputed in any of the affidavits filed by Plaintiff. R 49-52.
7.

On or about May 11, 1999, Defendant's counsel, who had not been involved in the

negotiation, then drafted a letter to Plaintiffs counsel paraphrasing the terms of the global
settlement. R 43-44 (Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Dismissal
with Prejudice and Request for hearing, Exhibit A). Defendant's Counsel, in the May 11, 1999
letter, properly paraphrased the parties' agreement with respect to the Tamarack matter and the
issuance of a first position trust deed. R 30-31 (Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson, ^ 7). However,
Defendant's counsel, mistakenly and inadvertently assumed that the trust deed which was to be
issued in connection with the present matter, would also be a first position trust deed. R 30-32
(Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson, paras. 7 and 16).
8.

Plaintiff subsequently rejected the offer set forth in the May 11, 1999 letter. R 31

(Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson 1} 10). Plaintiff has not denied this fact. See Record generally.
9.

On or about July 26, 1999, Defendant's Counsel sent a second letter to Plaintiffs

counsel. This July 26, 1999 letter more accurately represented the parties' agreement as it did not
require the trust deed in relation to the Summerhays matter to be a first position trust deed. R 45
and 46 (Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Dismissal with Prejudice,
Exhibit B).
10.

On or about September 14, 1999 a Stipulation for Dismissal, signed by Counsel for

each party, was filed with the Court. R 19-20.
11.

On or about September 15, 1999 the Court executed a Dismissal with Prejudice,
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which was likewise signed and approved by all counsel. R 21-22.
12.

Subsequent to the Dismissal With Prejudice, a Notice of Foreclosure was served

upon Plaintiff showing priority over the third position trust deed which was given to Plaintiff in
connection with the settlement of the Summerhays matter. R 26 (Affidavit of Howard Chuntz, ^
4).
13.

Plaintiff then filed a motion to set aside Dismissal with Prejudice and reinstate

Plaintiffs claim against Defendants, claiming that there was an additional term requiring first
position trust deeds on both the Tamarack matter as well as the Summerhays matter. R 27-28
(Brief of Appellant, p.3, ^ d). Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside cites absolutely no legal basis and is
not accompanied by a legal memorandum. R 27-28. The Motion was supported by only the
Affidavit of Howard Chuntz, which was filed in conjunction therewith. R 25-26.
14.

On or about November 22, 1999, Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc. filed a

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Dismissal With Prejudice and
Request for Hearing. R 34-46. Defendant's objection addresses the inadequacy of Plaintiff s
initial Motion, the failure to file a memorandum, and the lack of legal basis contained therein.
Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc. further address the fact that the parties' settlement had been a
global settlement, only a minor portion of which related to the claim and damages of the present
Summerhays matter, and that if the Trial Court set aside the Dismissal with Prejudice, the Trial
Court should also set aside the entire settlement agreement. Id.
15.

On or about December 20, 1999, Plaintiff filed the Reply to Richard A. Nelson's

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion, along with the Affidavit of Bryce Whitney and
the Affidavit of Ann Tucker. R 47-54. Once again, Plaintiff failed to identify or even refer to any
Bnef of Appellee
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legal basis. Id
16.

This matter came before the Trial Court on May 17, 2000, at 1:29 p.m. Plaintiff

had requested that the matter be conducted via a telephonic hearing and there was, therefore, no
stenographic, audio or visual record of the proceedings R 98-100 (Order Denying Motion to Set
Aside).
17. According to the Trial Court's June 5, 2000 Order Denying Motion to Set Aside, the
Trial Court had "thoroughly reviewed the related pleadings and affidavits in the file, [] heard the
arguments of all parties through their counsel" and found "good cause appearing" to deny
Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Dismissal With Prejudice. R 99 (Order Denying Motion to Set
Aside, p. 2).
18.

Whatever the terms of the parties' agreement were, the trust deeds actually given

to Plaintiff adequately secure Plaintiffs position. R 9 (Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson, If 9). This
fact is heretofore uncontested by Plaintiff. See Record generally.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff is not entitled to have the stipulated Dismissal with Prejudice set aside. First,
because Plaintiff provides the Trial Court with no legal basis for doing so. Additionally, Plaintiff
should be precluded from now raising legal arguments for the first time on appeal.
Second, the trial Court, having reviewed the facts and arguments of the parties, concluded
that the stipulated Dismissal with Prejudice should not be set aside. The Trial Court was well
within its discretion as substantial facts support RanCo's arguments and the Trial Court's
decision. The parties entered into an agreement which did not require a first position trust deed in
connection with the Summerhays matter. Plaintiffs agents were aware that the property was
Brief of Appellee
Whitewater v Summerhays, et al
Page 9 of 18

already encumbered with a first and second position trust deed. Because these facts present a
reasonable alternative to those presented by Plaintiff, it cannot be said that the Trial Court
committed a clear abuse of discretion. On the contrary, based upon the evidence presented, the
Trial Court was well within its discretion to refuse Plaintiffs motion to set aside.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE GIVEN THAT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION WAS
WITHOUT BASIS IN LAW.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to apply certain legal principles to the present

dispute. Plaintiff claims that the standard of appellate review as to this issue is a correction of
error standard. Brief of Appellant, p. 1.
Plaintiffs initial motion to set aside is without a stated legal basis, legal analysis, and is
completely without even a reference to law. R 27-28. Moreover, Plaintiffs initial, two-sentence
Motion is "unaccompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities" as required by the "Code
of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(l)(a)." R 27-38 (Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion to Set Aside Dismissal With Prejudice and Request for Hearing, pp 5-6). Even Plaintiffs
reply brief and the accompanying affidavits were void of any legal reference. R 47-54. This
single point establishes a sufficient basis for the Trial Court's denial of Plaintiff s Motion to Set
Aside the Dismissal with Prejudice. As Plaintiffs Trial Court pleadings present no legal basis
compelling any specific decision from the trial court, and as Plaintiffs Trial Court pleadings
present no legal basis for the Court of Appeals to review for correctness, Plaintiff has no basis for
claiming that any error was made or that any error should be corrected. See generally R 27-28,
47-49 (Motion to Set Aside Dismissal with Prejudice and Reinstate Plaintiffs Claim Against
Brief of Appellee
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Defendants and Reply to Richard A. Nelson's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion).
Contrary to Rule 24(a)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiff, for the
first time, on appeal, now identifies a potential legal basis but fails to exhibit grounds for seeking
review of an issue not preserved in the Trial Court. See Brief of Appellant, p. 1. Plaintiff is
precluded from asserting arguments on appeal which were not adequately briefed and preserved
below. "An appellate court generally will not review any issue that was not raised in the court
below." Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, p o . See also State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 n.6
(Utah 1993) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, this court will not consider issues raised for the
first time on appear); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (m[I]ssues not raised
at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal.' This rule applies to all claims, including
constitutional questions, unless the petitioner demonstrates that 'plain error' occurred or
'exceptional circumstances' exist." (quoting State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)))
"This rule is based, in part, on the principle that it is unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule
correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider." Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT

ioi, po.
It would, therefore, be improper to reverse the Trial Court's decision, when Plaintiff failed
to make a proper effort in arguing the present matter. Accordingly the trial court's Order
Denying Motion to Set Aside should be affirmed.
H.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AS THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED YIELDS TO DEFENDANT'S POSITION AT LEAST AS READILY
AS TO PLAINTIFF'S POSITION,
A Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed by this Court on a clear abuse of discretion basis.
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is ordinarilv reversed
Bnef of Appellee
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only for an abuse of discretion. mA trial court has discretion in determining
whether a movant has shown [Rule 60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the
trial court's ruling only when there has been an abuse ofdiscretion"' Ostler v.
Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted).
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 App 110,ffl[8 and 9 (Emphasis and additions
in the original). The Court of Appeals has held that the discretion of the finder of fact is respected
unless its decision is clearly erroneous.
the commissioner has "considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or
denying a motion to set aside a [default] judgment" and for this court to interfere,
"abuse of that discretion must be clearly shown." (Citations omitted). That is,
although "some basis may exist to set aside the default[, we will not conclude the
Commissioner] abused [his] discretion in refusing to do so when facts and
circumstances support the refusal." (Citations omitted). Further, we will not upset
the Commissioner's factual findings when challenged as unsupported by sufficient
evidence unless clearly erroneous.
Black's Title, Inc. v. State Ins. Dept, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting Katz v. Pierce,
732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) and PromaxDev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997)). See also In re Discipline of Pendleton,
2000 UT 77 H 38.
Pursuant to the above cited law, Plaintiff has not "clearly shown" an "abuse of discretion."
The Trial Court's Order Denying Motion to Set Aside is not "clearly erroneous" as it can be
reasonably said that the "facts and circumstances support the refusal."
For the first time on appeal, Plaintiff argues that there was a "mistake" under Rule
60(b)(1), or that there has been misrepresentation of fraud under Rule 60(b)(3). Plaintiff marshals
selective evidence with an attempt to supports its position that there was a "mistake in
understanding of the terms of the agreement. . . . On that basis alone, the Court should have
granted Plaintiffs Motion to set aside the Order." Brief of Appellant, pp 6-7. However, when all
Brief of Appellee
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the evidence is marshaled, there is no basis for a claim of abuse of discretion. On the contrary,
when all of the evidence is marshaled, it reveals a conflict or divergence in the parties' positions,
Defendant's position being at least as tenable as Plaintiffs.
Plaintiff first discusses its own interpretation of the May 11, 1999 letter and of the July 26,
1999 letter sent from Russell S. Mitchell, counsel for Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc. Plaintiff
argues that the May 11, 1999 letter established an offer relating to both the Tamerack and
Summerhays matters, and requiring a first position trust deed on the Summerhays matter. Brief of
Appellant, pp 5-6. Admitting that there had been some negotiation between the two letters,
Plaintiff continues by arguing that the July 26, 1999 letter actually
clarified changes in the agreement with respect to a settlement of a matter not
dealing with the lawsuit involving the Summerhays [the Tamarack matter] and
reiterating the agreement already reached between the parties with respect to the
debt owing by RanCo to Plaintiff with respect to the Summerhays Complaint.
Nothing in the July 26th letter makes any reference to an alteration in the agreement
that RanCo would give plaintiff a first position trust deed note and trust deed with
respect to the Summerhays debt and plaintiff had no reason to expect that any
change was intended.
Brief of Appellant, pp. 5 and 6.
Plaintiff then very briefly, and incompletely, identifies Defendant's position as to only the
May 11, 1999 letter, quoting from the Affidavit of Richard A. Neilson:
Through an oversight and miscommunication, Mr. Mitchell inadvertently stated in
a letter that not only the Tamarack matter would involve a first position deed of
trust, but he also erroneously stated that the Summerhays matter would be handled
by a deed of trust in first position.
* * *

I cannot identify why there was a communication breakdown on whether the deed
of trust on Lot 4 would be a first or second position deed of trust as between me
nay my attorney.
Brief of Appellee
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Brief of Appellant, p. 6 (quoting R 30 and 32).
After this cursory synopsis of the facts, Plaintiff concludes that
it is clear from these letters and the affidavit that a mistake in understanding of the
terms of the agreement between the parties upon which the Stipulation to Dismiss
had occurred. On this basis alone, the Court should have granted plaintiffs
Motion to set aside the Order Dismissing its Comparing and not doing so was an
abuse of discretion.
Brief of Appellant, p. 6.
Plaintiffs conclusion is premature as it fails to consider all the evidence. First, Plaintiff
fails to recognize Defendant RanCo's argument that the parties had already reached an
understanding and established a binding agreement, and that his attorney had "inadvertently"
misparaphrased the same. R 30 and 32 (Affidavit of Richard Nelson,fflf7 and 16). With this
single, additional allegation, a finder of fact is justified in enforcing the agreement and refusing to
set aside the corresponding Dismissal With Prejudice.
Plaintiff also fails to martial additional evidence, first that Plaintiff undisputably rejected
the "inadvertent" offer contained in the May 11, 1999 letter and that the parties' actual agreement
was contained in the July 26, 1999 letter. R 31 (Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson, If 10).
Plaintiff also does not address the fact that the July 26, 1999 letter does not require the
trust deed to settle the Summerhays matter to be a first position trust Deed. R 45-46. Plaintiff
does not address the undisputed fact that its agents, Mr. Witney and Ms. Tucker, had each
reviewed the escrow file of Defendant RanCo, and knew that a first and second trust deed were
already in place. R 30 (Affidavit of Richard A. Nelson, ^ 5).
When all the evidence is marshaled, it does not suggest that the Trial Court abused its
discretion. The facts presented by Defendant RanCo are at least as compelling as those facts
Brief of Appellee
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presented by Plaintiff.
At the end of Plaintiff s Point A, Plaintiff presents the following thesis: " If RanCo's
president and its attorney knew, at the time of submitting the Stipulation to Plaintiff for signature,
that it was giving a second position trust deed when a first position trust deed had been promised,
then that would certainly constitute misrepresentation, if not fraud, upon Plaintiff." Nowhere in
the record of this case does Plaintiff even allege that Defendants intentionally or fraudulently
misrepresented to Plaintiff that Defendant RanCo would provide a first position trust deed while it
intended to actually executed a third position trust deed. See Record generally. Moreover, the
Brief of Appellant, fails to marshal evidence which would support a clear and convincing case for
fraud or intentional mistake, yet alone evidence sufficient to clearly establish the Trial Court's
abuse of discretion in concluding otherwise.
Plaintiff has failed to martial the evidence, to show mistake, fraud, or misrepresentation.
Plaintiff has failed to show that the evidence stands clearly against Defendants such that a finding
for Defendants would be a clear abuse of the Court's Discretion. Therefore, the trial Court's June
5, 2000 Order Denying Motion to Set Aside should be affirmed.
A.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion as Plaintiff Did Not and
Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case for Mutual Mistake.

Plaintiff next argues that the Trial Court failed to apply contract principles. Brief of
Appellant, pp 7-9.2 Plaintiff briefly discussed the requirement of meeting of the minds and the law
of mutual mistake. Plaintiff then simply concludes that one of two alternatives is mandatory:

2

PlaintifFs second argument, Point B, relies on the same facts as its first argument, Point

A.
Brief of Appellee
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Again, either plaintiff, its attorney and RanCo's attorney all understood that
RanCo was giving plaintiff afirstposition trust deed for the Summerhays debt and,
therefore, all were mutually mistaken about the [sic] second position trust deed
that was actually given, or plaintiff mistakenly believed it was receiving a first
position trust deed for the Summerhays debt from RanCo, but RanCo knew of this
mistake and kept silent about only giving plaintiff a second position trust deed.
Brief of Appellant, p 8. This conclusion is a summary of the law of mutual mistake; u(l)That the
instrument as made failed to conform to what both parties intended; or (2) That the claiming party
was mistaken as to its actual content and the other party, knowing of this mistake, kept silent."
Id.
Plaintiffs conclusion fails to address the issue at hand, the alternatives suggested by
RanCo, which lie beyond the scope of the law of mutual mistake: that the parties in fact had an
agreement and an understanding, or that Plaintiff may have been mistaken, but RanCo did not
know of the mistake and actually took steps to assure that no mistake had been made. When all
evidence, including that represented by RanCo, is marshaled, alternatives beyond those suggested
by Plaintiff become apparent and viable: The parties had an initial understanding that a third
position trust deed would be issued, that Defendant showed Plaintiff the first and second trust
deed on the encumbered property, that the parties agreed to a third position trust deed, that
thereafter defendants' attorney inadvertently stated in the May 11, 1999 letter that the trust deed
would be infirstposition, that the May 11, 1999 offer was rejected, that the July 26, 1999 letter
was delivered three months later, removing the "inadvertently" stated term of delivering a first
position trust deed in harmony with the fact that there was already a first and second position
trust deed in place.
It is Plaintiffs burden to establish that the Trial Court committed an abuse of discretion, to
Brief of Appellee
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clearly establish that the facts are so strongly in favor of Plaintiff that the Trial Court should not
have concluded other than in Plaintiffs favor. However, Plaintiff must marshal all evidence,
including RanCo's evidence which supports the additional alternatives. Because this additional
evidence was before the Trial Court, and because this evidence presents a reasonable and tenable
alternative, the Trial Court cannot be said to have clearly abused its discretion. The Trial Court's
Order Denying Motion to Set Aside should, therefore, be affirmed.
Bo

The Trial Court Has Discretion to Deny the Setting Aside of the Dismissal
with Prejudice until the Court Finds "Such Terms as Are Just" and the
Court Is Convinced That Setting Aside Would Be "In Furtherance of
Justice."

Rule 60, of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly preserves the Trial Court's
discretion in the present situation, stating that relief may be granted "upon such terms as are just,"
and " the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party." Rule 60(b)(2000).
In the present matter, plaintiff did not present a compelling argument, neither a legal
argument grounded in law, nor a factual argument grounded in evidence which presented terms
justifying its Motion to set aside. Nor did the Trial Court feel that Plaintiffs Motion was in the
furtherance ofjustice, compelling the Trial Court to set aside the Dismissal with Prejudice.
First, as previously averred by Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc., without objection in the
Trial Court record, or in the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff remains adequately secured and suffers
no damage as a result of Plaintiffs purported "mistake in understanding." Second, the underlying
global settlement was the settlement of several matters: the present matter involving claims of
approximately $8,000.00, which is the lynch pin to a related collateral matter between Defendant
RanCo Homes, Inc. and Defendant Barbara B. Summerhays, and the Tamarack matter between
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Plaintiff Whitewater Whirlpool Baths & Systems, Inc., and Defendant RanCo Homes, Inc.
involving claims in excess of $30,000.00. The present dispute constitutes less than 25% of the
overall settlement principal. If the trial court were to find mutual mistake and set aside the
settlement and the Dismissal with Prejudice, pursuant to Plaintiffs argument, then the entire
global settlement should be set aside, as it is unrefuted that the global settlement was contingent
upon each individual term. Such a setting aside would effect parties and claims in addition to and
larger than the present matter. Third, Plaintiff may, if it is so included, file suit for fraud or
mistake of the underlying settlement agreement in a separate matter.
Each of these three arguments establish an additional basis for the Trial Court's denial of
Plaintiffs motion, such not being upon just terms or in furtherance of Justice.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision of the Trial Court. Plaintiff has failed to present a
legal basis upon the Trial Court record. Plaintiff has failed to martial all evidence and establish
that the facts yield only to Plaintiffs arguments, such that the Trial Court has clearly committed
an abuse of Discretion. Therefore, this Court should refuse Plaintiffs request and affirm the Trial
Court's Order Denying Motion to Set Aside.
DATED this JT*

day of January, 2001.
Jenkins & Jensen LLP
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